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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In an episode of the classic British political comedy, Yes Minister, Jim Hacker, the fictional Minister of 
Administrative Affairs, is discussing Britain’s relationship with the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) with his wily Permanent Secretary, Sir Humphrey Appleby. Sir Humphrey explains 
that for the past 500 years, Britain has had one key policy objective: to create a disunited Europe. In 
response, Hacker asks why, if that is the case, Britain had been pushing for more members. To which 
Sir Humphrey replies, “the more members it has, the more arguments it can stir up, the more futile 
and impotent it becomes.” This sketch has become somewhat legendary for the way in which it 
managed to encapsulate traditional British thinking on the European Union (EU) and on enlargement. 
Although the rationale for encouraging expansion was primarily – though not exclusively – driven by 
very specific reasons, most notably the wish to prevent a further deepening of political ties within the 
EU, over the decades it has nevertheless benefited those countries that have been queuing up to join 
the Union. This in turn made London an important potential ally for aspiring members. 
 
However, this has now changed. While the Foreign Office is still keen to stress that the United Kingdom 
is committed to further EU expansion, and that it remains a lead actor in the enlargement process, the 
reality is that the UK is no longer regarded as the champion of the dossier. With the growth of 
euroscepticism, and the increasingly hostile debate over immigration, Britain’s political leaders have 
ceased to be the Union’s most strident supporters of further expansion. Meanwhile, increasing talk of 
the possibility that the United Kingdom may yet leave the European Union has also served to weaken 
British influence in the region. 
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6.2 BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT 
 
 
The United Kingdom has long been committed to the enlargement of the European Union.109 As one of 
the ‘Big Three’ members of the EU, it has often been seen as the most important champion of the bloc’s 
expansion. This has been a direct reflection of the underlying philosophy that successive British 
governments have taken towards the EU. Fearful of a real or perceived wish by France and Germany to 
proceed towards an ever-deeper union, Britain came to see enlargement as the natural mechanism to 
prevent this process. As a result, the UK was at the forefront of enlargement efforts in the late 1990s, 
which led to the accession of eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe, along with Cyprus and Malta, 
in 2004. Crucially, at a popular level, enlargement enjoyed relatively strong public support. For example, 
a Eurobarometer survey taken in 2006, just two years after the 2004 enlargement that saw the admission 
of ten new members, showed that while Britain was not the strongest supporter of EU enlargement 
amongst the pre-enlargement EU-15, a plurality (44%) of those expressing a view favoured further 
expansion. This stood in marked contrast to the majorities in Germany (66%), Luxembourg (65%), France 
(62%), Austria (61%), and Finland (60%) who disapproved of further EU enlargement.110 
 
Following on from the ‘big bang’ enlargement in 2004, London keenly supported the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania to the Union, in 2007. It also became a strong advocate for Croatia’s 
membership, in July 2013; the European Union’s first foray into the Western Balkans – usually defined 
as the former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia but including Albania. In this case, Britain was delighted to 
discover that Zagreb shared many of London’s concerns about the direction of the European Union. 
Croatian political figures made it clear that the EU the country was joining was not the Union they had 
signed up to join. It was also telling that a referendum on membership, held in January 2012, saw 66% 
of Croatians in favour of integration from a turnout of 43%. By the time it acceded, in July 2013, support 
for membership was extremely low and there was little trust in EU institutions. Britain therefore 
identified Croatia as a potentially useful ally in its efforts to bring about fundamental reforms in the 
European Union or else seek to renegotiate the terms of its own EU membership.111 
 
Meanwhile, Britain remained a stalwart supporter of Turkish accession to the European Union. Yet 
again, this has in many ways been the ultimate example of the British tactic of avoiding deeper union 
by pursuing a wider union. In the minds of many observers, accepting Turkey would bring about a 
fundamental transformation of the very nature of the EU. At the moment, with a population of 77 
million, Turkey would be the second largest member of the Union. By the time it would be feasibly 
ready to join, which would not be until the late-2020s, it will have overtaken Germany, and therefore 
would accede as the largest member. Moreover, many felt, and with good reason, that Turkey’s views 
on sovereignty and national identity were rather more akin to British views than those of the more 
integrationist members of the European Union. With this in mind, Britain long stood out as Turkey’s 
champion within the EU, with David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, telling an audience in Ankara, 
in 2010, that he was, “the strongest possible advocate” of Turkish membership.112 While French and 
German politicians have over the years expressed their reservations about Turkish EU entry, although 
often keen not to upset Turkey by rejecting membership out of hand, British political figures from 
across the political spectrum would express their strongest support for Turkish accession. Rarely was 
anything heard in Britain about the way in which this could disrupt EU decision-making processes. 
                                                          
109  The Future of EU Enlargement, European Union Committee, House of Lords, Tenth Report of Session 2012-13. 
110  Special Eurobarometer, “Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement”, July 2006, p.3. 
111  British diplomat, comments to the author, May 2013. However, despite this belief that Croatia may be a useful ally, it was 
noticeable that Zagreb did not support David Cameron’s high-profile opposition to the appointment of Jean-Claude 
Juncker to the post of president of the European Commission. 
112  Speech by David Cameron, in Ankara, 27 July 2010, available at: Number 10 website, www.number10.gov.uk (last 
accessed on: 17 February 2015). 
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6.3 BRITAIN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BALKANS 
 
 
Against this backdrop of general support for EU enlargement, the United Kingdom has always favoured 
expansion into the Balkans. However, it has never stood out as an advocate for the region as a whole 
in the same way as, for example, Greece and Austria. This is in large part down to history. Traditionally, 
the UK does not have strong ties to the region. Certainly, there have been periods of British interest in 
the Balkans. The Commemorations of the start of the First World War are a testament to this. However, 
such involvement has been relatively limited. For much of the second half of the twentieth century, 
the Balkans barely registered on the British geopolitical radar. At a time of decolonisation and the Cold 
War, the United Kingdom’s political focus lay elsewhere. 
 
The collapse of Yugoslavia and the bitter civil wars that ensued forced the UK to take a stronger interest 
in developments in the Balkans. However, even then, the willingness to get involved remained 
lukewarm. It was not until the election of Tony Blair as Prime Minister, in 1997, that the United 
Kingdom adopted a more clearly interventionist approach towards the Balkans. This was seen most 
clearly in the decision to take the lead over military intervention in Kosovo, in 1999. But even this did 
not translate into any fundamental reorientation of British foreign policy. Very quickly British attention 
turned elsewhere, most notably to Afghanistan and Iraq. Even now, apart from a couple of key 
examples that will be explored in the next section, there is relatively little high-level interest in the 
Balkans, certainly when compared with much of the rest of the world. As one official put it, Britain has 
never regarded the Balkans as its ‘backyard’ in the same way that other EU members have.113 
 
Additionally, there have been few cultural links to the Balkans. Historically, immigrants came from 
Ireland and other parts of the Commonwealth. Of course, there were some from the Balkans, such as 
those who fled Yugoslavia under Tito. However, they tended to be quite small in number. And although 
many tens of thousands of refugees arrived in Britain during and immediately after the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia, the Balkan community in the United Kingdom is still not particularly large, especially 
compared to other communities. Since 2004, the size of the immigrant communities from the Balkans, 
such as they were, have become relatively smaller following the influx of many new immigrants from 
Poland, Slovakia and the other new members states. At present, according to the most recent census, 
the total population of those born in the Balkans and now living in the UK stands at around 65,000.114 
This hardly compares to, for example, 694,000 from India; 579,000 from Poland; 274,000 from 
Germany; 191,000 Nigeria; and 177,000 from the United States. To this extent, there was never a 
powerful constituency in Britain to push the case for membership of the Balkan states. Nor was there 
any overarching interest in pressing the case for enlargement into the Balkans in order to placate a 
domestic audience. 
 
Lastly, there have been no underlying economic factors driving Britain towards supporting the region. 
Despite strong efforts from the Foreign Office to try to encourage British investment in the Balkans,115 
                                                          
113  British official, comments to the author, July 2014. 
114  “Of the 28,000 Kosovan-born residents in 2011, 70% arrived during the period 1997-2003. This peak is associated with 
the war in Kosovo (1997-1999); this is likely to have been responsible for the high number of Albanian-born residents 
arriving in the same period, since the conflict affected neighbouring Albania: of the 13,000 Albanian-born residents in 
2011, 35% (5,000) arrived during the period 1997-2000…The break up of the former Yugoslavia after 1992 resulted in a 
number of conflicts in the Balkan region. This included the Bosnian war (1992-95) which resulted in a peak in arrivals in 
1991-1996, accounting for 66% of the 8,000 Bosnian-born residents in England and Wales in 2011. Of the 8,000 Croatian-
born residents in 2011, 33% arrived in the period 1997-2000; 19% of the 9,000 residents born in Serbia and Montenegro 
arrived in the same period.” Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011, Office for 
National Statistics, 17 December 2013, pp.17 and 18. 
115  International official, comments to the author, October 2014. 
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the region is all but ignored by British businesses. Apart from their main markets in the European 
Union, British companies have long looked towards further flung familiar territory, such as the 
members of the Commonwealth. This is clearly seen in trade statistics. Not a single Balkan country 
features in the top 50 of UK export markets or sources of imports.116 This lack of commercial interest 
in the region is also supported by anecdotal evidence. For example, one new ambassador from the 
region decided to focus on building trade ties between his country and Britain. However, he was 
quickly informed by a leading banker with a strong interest in the Balkans that this would be an all but 
pointless task. British businesses just were not that interested in the area.117 This difficultly in 
drumming up commercial interest has also been experienced by other ambassadors from the region 
based in London.118 
 
6.4 CURRENT ATTITUDES TO BALKAN ENLARGEMENT 
 
 
Where there has been a strong and specific British interest in the accession of the Balkans, it has been 
narrowly focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the interrelated accession paths of Serbia and Kosovo. In 
the case of Bosnia, British involvement has been driven by a number of factors. In part, it seems to be 
fostered by guilt for not having played a greater part during the conflict in the 1990s.119 Related to this, 
it is also prompted by the fact that Britain has played an enormous role supporting the reconstruction 
and stabilisation of the state following the end of the war in 1995. Britain was not only active in 
peacekeeping, it has also been at the forefront of many other efforts to try to build functioning 
institutions and promote reconciliation. This was seen most obviously during the period when Paddy 
Ashdown, the former leader of the Liberal Democrats, served as the High Representative. Since 2010, 
Britain has paid particularly close attention to the country as a result of the strong personal interest in 
the situation shown by the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague. However, British interest in Bosnia 
has continued even after Hague’s departure from the Foreign Office. In November 2014, Britain and 
Germany joined forces to unveil a ‘New Strategic Approach’ to reinvigorate Bosnia’s EU accession 
process.120 This in many ways served to cement Britain’s reputation as the most engaged EU member in 
Bosnia.121 And yet, at the same time, the attention given to Bosnia has been declining. For example, the 
Department for International Development (DFID) ceased operations in the country in February 2011.122 
 
As for Serbia and Kosovo, British interest is a product of its close involvement in the situation in Kosovo 
from 1999 onwards. As noted, the United Kingdom led the call for NATO air strikes against Serbia. 
Thereafter, in 2006, as the UN talks to decide Kosovo’s future status began, Britain was the first major 
state involved in the process as part of the six nation Contact Group – comprising Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States – to openly assert that it believed that there was no 
alternative to independence. Since then, and following the declaration of independence, in February 
2008, London has become, along with the United States, and somewhat later, Germany, one of the 
key patrons of an independent Kosovo. To this end, it has not only taken strong steps to press for 
                                                          
116  UK’s Top 50 Export Markets and Import Sources for 2013, Office for National Statistics, 10 July 2014, available at: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/uktrade/uk-trade/may-2014/rtd-publication-tables-uk-trade--may-2014.xls  
(last accessed on: 16 July 2014). 
117  Ambassador of a Western Balkan state, comments to the author, April, 2014. 
118  Ambassador of a Western Balkan state, comments to the author, September 2014. 
119  British official, comments to the author, October 2014. 
120  “Speech: Bosnia & Herzegovina - a new strategic approach”,, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 5 November 2014, 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/bosnia-herzegovina-a-new-strategic-approach (last accessed 
on: 12 February 2015). 
121  EU official, comments to the author, 2012. 
122  “The DFID Bosnia and Herzegovina office is now closed”, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DFID, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/world/organisations/dfid-bosnia-herzogovina (last accessed on: 3 October 2014). 
Although, as pointed out, 15% of all EU money spent in the country comes from the UK. 
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Kosovo’s wider recognition on the international stage, but has also been keen to see an enhancement 
of Kosovo’s EU integration prospects.123 
 
At the same time, London has also been active in trying to reduce Serbia’s resistance to an independent 
Kosovo. In this endeavour, it has often been willing to use the prospect of EU membership as both a 
carrot and a stick against Belgrade. For example, when Serbia proposed taking Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), London reacted by suggesting that such a 
move could threaten its EU accession prospects;124 although it soon backed down when it realised that 
such intimidation attempts could have a very negative impact. Thereafter, Britain also took a strong 
position on the importance of Serbia’s normalisation of relations with Kosovo as a crucial element of its 
accession process. It has also strongly supported the efforts of the External Action Service, firstly under 
Robert Cooper and then Catherine Ashton (both British), to secure a series of agreements enhancing day-
to-day cooperation between Belgrade and in Pristina. To this extent, London’s role in the case of Serbia’s 
EU accession process is largely the product of its policies regarding Kosovo. 
 
However, beyond this focus on the very specific cases of Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo, the United 
Kingdom has tended not to take the lead on pressing the case for further EU enlargement as regards 
the other countries in the region; those are Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(fYROM) and Albania. While Britain certainly takes steps to enhance their accession prospects – for 
instance through financing a number of activities aimed at enhancing various sectors, such as ‘judicial 
reform and media freedom’, and the programme of seconding British officials to prospective 
members125 – the United Kingdom has certainly not emerged as a real advocate for their membership 
in the same way as Greece (and to a certain extent Britain) pushed for Cyprus in 2004 and Germany 
championed, for example, Poland in 2004. For instance, in the case of fYROM, while the UK led the 
way in calling for it to be given candidate status during its presidency in 2005,126 it has not emerged as 
a particular advocate for its EU membership since then. In particular, it has not done anything to try 
and break the deadlock between Skopje and Athens over the name issue. 
 
Elsewhere, it appears to have adopted a more sceptical and cautious approach towards enlargement. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of this was London’s decision, in December 2013, to align with four 
other EU member states – the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Denmark – in blocking Albania’s 
candidacy for EU membership. Although this decision was subsequently reversed at the European 
Council in June 2014, when Albania did in fact become a formal candidate country, it nevertheless came 
as quite a surprise to many observers. The feeling in Albania had been that Britain was one of the few 
countries they could rely on.127 In part, this change is a reflection of the fact that Britain, like most of the 
rest of the European Union, increasingly believes that it is vital that new members are able to meet the 
demands of membership. Few want to see a repeat of the problems presented by Romania and Bulgaria. 
Also, Britain has consistently raised concerns over organised crime in Albania.128 However, in many ways, 
the decision over Albania also appears to be indicative of a more fundamental transformation in the 
relationship between Britain and the EU that is reshaping British policy towards enlargement. 
 
                                                          
123  “Promoting stability throughout the Western Balkans”, UK government, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/promoting-stability-throughout-the-western-balkans--2 (last accessed on:  
16 July 2014). 
124  “ICJ move direct challenge to EU”, B92, 3 August 2008. 
125  British official, comments to the author, October 2014. 
126  British official, comments to the author, August 2014. 
127  British official, comments to the author, June 2014. 
128  British official, comments to the author, August 2014. 
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6.5 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE 
 
 
Within the corridors of the Foreign Office there is still a commitment to enlargement.129 However, 
there is no doubt that mainstream political support for enlargement has declined. This is primarily due 
to the growing focus on immigration in British political debate; a development that has seen freedom 
of movement within the EU conflated, deliberately or otherwise, with the arrival of people from 
outside the European Union. 
 
In 2004, Britain was one of the few EU member states that decided to waive the seven-year transitional 
restrictions on freedom of movement on the ten new members. However, in the case of Romania and 
Bulgaria, it was noticeable that the United Kingdom decided to join other EU members and impose 
transitional restrictions on both countries. Seven-year controls were also introduced when Croatia 
joined the Union, in 2013. This change in policy over transition periods was driven by the large-scale 
immigration that occurred after 2004 that far exceeded expectations. As a result, British public opinion 
– coupled with a media that is dominated by newspapers that take a distinctly Eurosceptic line – has 
become increasingly concerned about the demographic implications of further EU expansion. Indeed, 
a December 2013 poll showed that British voters identified limits on new arrivals from elsewhere in 
the Union as the single most important issue that would need to be tackled in any UK effort to reform 
its relationship with the EU.130 It is this growing focus on freedom of movement that has largely led to 
the massive surge in support for the arch-Eurosceptic and anti-immigration United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP). In May 2014, it received the most support of any British party in European 
Parliament elections. Just a few months later, in October and November 2014, it won its first ever UK 
parliamentary seats in bye-elections held after the defection of two Conservative MPs.131 
 
Against this backdrop, all the political parties have become increasingly hard-line on the subject of 
immigration, and consequently on the prospect of further enlargement. This has been particularly 
evident in the ruling Conservative Party, which has found itself under increasing pressure to appeal to 
those people that are seen to be its traditionally core supporters, many of whom are either 
sympathetic to UKIP’s policies or have formally defected to the party. As a result, a seismic shift 
appears to have taken place. Whereas in the past, enlargement was seen as the best way in which to 
stave off efforts at greater EU centralisation, this is now offset by the political costs of arrivals from 
these new member states.132 Enlargement can only continue if it is done in such a way that it limits the 
freedom of movement of citizens of acceding countries. This necessarily affects the Western Balkans. 
As David Cameron stated: “As we contemplate countries like Serbia and Albania one day joining the 
EU we must find a way to slow down access to each other’s labour markets until we can be sure this 
will not cause vast migrations […] I look forward to finding a way to continue with enlargement but in 
a way that regains the trust and support of our peoples.”133 
                                                          
129  British official, comments to the author, October 2014. “EU Enlargement”, House of Lords Hansard (Daily record of 
Parliament), Written Answers, Tuesday 17 June 2014. 
130  “EU referendum: the red lines for swing voters”, YouGov, 18 December 2013. 
131  Both cited immigration as a major concern that had driven their decisions. “It's time for change”, Douglas Carswell Blog, 
28 August 2014; “Why I am leaving the Conservative party and joining UKIP”, Mark Reckless, 27 September 2014, available 
at: http://markreckless.com/2014/09/27/why-i-am-leaving-the-conservative-party-and-joining-ukip/ (last accessed on: 
29 September 2014). 
132  “How the Tory right turned against EU enlargement”, The Guardian, 21 December 2013; “Once Tories’ answer to EU fears, 
enlargement is now their problem”, The Observer, 30 December 2013. 
133  “UK no longer advocates for EU enlargement”, Euractiv, 21 December 2013. Members of the government are now making 
it ever more clear that there can no longer be an unfettered right of freedom of movement and that some measures will 
have to be introduced. For instance, it has been suggested that in the future controls could be put in place. One idea that 
has been floated, for example, is that the freedom of movement from any new member would be limited until such time 
as the per capita income of the new entrant reaches a certain proportion of the EU average per capita income. 
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The immigration issue has become so politically sensitive that other parties now have to take an 
increasingly tough line on the issue. For example, despite strongly endorsing Britain’s place in the EU 
in a speech before British business leaders, in November 2012, Ed Miliband, the former leader of the 
Labour Party, nevertheless stated that, “while enlarging the EU was good for Britain’s strategic interest, 
frankly, the way that we handled immigration without transitional controls increased scepticism here 
in Britain.”134 Since then, the link between immigration and future enlargement has become even more 
explicit. On New Year’s Day 2014, one television station sent a camera crew to Luton Airport (which 
handles a lot of flights to central and eastern Europe) to interview Keith Vaz, the Labour Party MP who 
chairs the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, about the expected influx of Bulgarians 
and Romanians. There were precious few to be seen. However, he was unrepentant. Although there 
may not have been a sudden deluge of immigrants from the two Eastern Balkan countries, he 
nevertheless pointed out that fYROM, Montenegro and Serbia were all queuing up to join the 
European Union and would be the next new members. Britain would need to be prepared for that and 
the matter of further immigration would need to be put to the British people.135 While there is little to 
suggest that the Labour Party is becoming overtly Eurosceptic, it appears that in trying to maintain a 
broadly pro-EU position, it has to be seen to be acknowledging voters’ concerns. EU enlargement 
becomes a very convenient target. 
 
Finally, even the Liberal Democrats, the party that has most consistently maintained an openly pro-
European line, has also become more cautious. Officially, it supports further EU enlargement as a 
policy. As the party stated in its 2014 European Parliament election manifesto, “Liberal Democrats 
support further enlargement of the European Union to candidate countries. Membership of the 
European Union continues to hold out the best hope for lasting peace and stability in the Western 
Balkans.” However, in reality, it too is far less committed to enlargement than it once was. It will 
maintain the rhetoric about enlargement as a longer-term goal, but certainly will do nothing to press 
the case in the short term.136 
 
Of course, there is very little rationale in this debate. The entire combined population of the seven 
Balkan countries lining up for membership is less than 18 million. This is considerably less than the 22 
million in Romania, which joined in 2007. Also, there are very good reasons to argue that when these 
countries do join the EU, Britain will not be their natural destination of choice. For most of the region, 
Germany is a much more likely option. Britain actually tends to be relatively low in the list of preferred 
destinations for the Balkan countries.137 Also, it is important to note that while there is general 
opposition to the idea of further immigration from new member states, there are those who do still 
see the need for expansion, such as the pro-immigration business lobby that can grasp the advantages 
of bringing in new members with young, able and educated workforces.138 Such pressure could grow 
in the event that large numbers of people from the earlier enlargements decide to return to the 
countries of origin. 
 
In the meantime, the focus on immigration has had very important immediate consequences in the 
region. While the rest of the European Union has introduced visa liberalisation for almost all of the 
Balkans (Kosovo is the exception), the United Kingdom has kept strict limits in place. Indeed, it has 
                                                          
134  “One Nation in Europe – Ed Miliband”, Labour Party website, 12 November 2012, available at: 
http://www.labour.org.uk/one-nation-in-europe (last accessed on 21 July 2014). 
135  “Migrant Numbers ‘Should Be Decided By People’”, Sky News, 1 January 2014. 
136  Senior Liberal Democrat figure, correspondence with the author, July 2014. 
137  A 2009 report showed that the most popular destination, in order, were Germany, USA, Switzerland, Italy, Australia/New 
Zealand, France, Austria, Greece, Sweden, Canada and then UK. “The Impact of Migration”, Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2009, p.3. 
138  British ambassador to a Western Balkans state, comments to author, June 2014. 
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become notoriously difficult and expensive to obtain a British visa.139 This would appear to be having 
a very negative effect on how the countries of the region see the UK.140 As one observer put it, the 
immigration policy, “isn’t in accordance with the rhetoric on enlargement.”141 
 
6.6 THE BREXIT DEBATE 
 
 
In addition to freedom of movement, another factor that is shaping the discussion about the United 
Kingdom and enlargement is the question of British membership of the European Union. Over the 
course of the past few years, attention has increasingly turned to the possibility that the UK may in 
fact leave the EU. Although on balance this may seem to be unlikely, the mere fact that the argument 
has gained such prominence suggests that it cannot be discounted entirely. As a result, there is a 
growing concern amongst observers that the European Union, realising that Britain may be on its way 
out, is taking less notice of its views.142 It would seem likely that this applies as much to enlargement 
as to any other issues, perhaps even more so given that it seems strange to pay attention to the views 
of Britain on new members when it wants to leave the ‘club’. 
 
At the same time, the debate is also being followed in the Balkans. This is having a negative impact on 
Britain’s influence and standing. It seems that these states increasingly question whether it is worth 
engaging actively with the United Kingdom when their invariably meagre diplomatic and political 
resources would be better used engaging with countries that can help them to join the EU. Even the 
discussions about a possible British exit from the European Union may well have contributed to a 
growing sense amongst political elites engaged in the accession process in these countries that 
Germany is now the main actor they should focus on.143 This impression will no doubt have been 
cemented by the fact that Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, appears to want Germany to 
become the champion of the Balkan expansion.144 There is also a sense that aligning with Britain may 
actually be counterproductive inasmuch as it is far better to be seen as a good European.145  
 
Meanwhile, at a popular level, a rather more mixed picture emerges. On the one hand, the possibility 
of the UK leaving the EU appears to have received little widespread attention in the region, certainly 
when compared to the greater level of attention given to the immigration debate. As one British official 
put it, the media and ordinary citizens appear to have little awareness about the internal politics of the 
United Kingdom.146 However, it has not gone completely unnoticed. As elsewhere in Europe, there are 
many Eurosceptics in the Balkans who oppose membership of the European Union; even if their place 
in mainstream politics tends to be rather limited.147 Amongst these political parties and organisations 
opposed to EU membership, there is in fact a lot of admiration for Britain “for standing up to 
                                                          
139  As pointed out, it is now more expensive to get a six month visa for the UK than a 10-year one for the United States. This 
has had an enormous impact on how people in the region view Britain. International official, comment to the author, 
October 2014. 
140  United Kingdom MEP, comments to the author, July 2014. 
141  International official, comments to the author, October 2014. 
142  “Lobbyists fear loss of British sway in EU”, Financial Times, 6 March 2013.  
143  International official, comments to the author, October 2014; Former ambassador from a Balkan state, comments to the 
author, July 2014. As the diplomat noted, “Germany is now seen as the most important country, full stop. United States 
comes second.” 
144  “Merkel to organise Western Balkans conference in August”, Euractiv, 13 June 2014. However, other countries, such as 
Greece and Italy, are still seen by some as key actors. In contrast, Britain is not. Serbian official, comments to the author, 
July 2014. 
145  Serbian official, comments to the author, July 2014. 
146  British official, comments to the author, October 2014. 
147  For more on Eurosceptic parties in the region see Stratulat, Corina (ed.) (2014), “EU integration and party politics in the 
Balkans”, EPC Issue Paper, No.77. 
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‘Europe”.148 As one regional diplomat stated, “You would not believe how popular Nigel Farage [the 
leader of UKIP] is in parts of the Balkans.”149 To these groups, Britain is increasingly seen as an ally in 
the campaign to keep them out of the EU. 
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Traditionally, the United Kingdom has been a staunch supporter of European Union enlargement. Over 
the past three decades, Britain has seen the continued expansion of the European Union as the best 
defence against efforts to pursue more political integration. To this extent, successive British 
governments have taken a strong interest in helping new member states join the European Union. 
Even if Britain has tended only to pay close attention to a small number of countries, namely Bosnia, 
Serbia and Kosovo, the wish to see the EU expand has necessarily had a positive effect on other 
countries in the Balkans. 
 
However, there can be little doubt that the UK’s overall attitude towards enlargement, and its ability 
to shape the Union’s policies in this area, has undergone a profound transformation over the course 
of the Conservative-led period of coalition governments, and particularly since the latter half of 2013. 
The increasingly shrill immigration debate in Britain, coupled with rising Euroscepticism and growing 
support for UKIP, has meant that the British government has been faced with an increasingly 
unpalatable political choice. While further EU enlargement would help to maintain the continued 
battle to minimise political union within the EU, it also means the arrival of more people to British 
shores. The fact that there is no appetite within the EU to allow for restrictions on freedom of 
movement means that this matter has become an either/or issue: either more expansion and more 
new immigrants, or less future enlargement and less new arrivals. It seems as though, under prevailing 
political conditions, London has opted for the latter. While the Foreign Office remains absolutely 
adamant that Britain remains one of the strongest supporters of enlargement, and is still a driving 
force behind enlargement, this is not how it is perceived beyond the United Kingdom, or even amongst 
pro-Europeans within Britain.150 The discussions over immigration have presented a very negative 
picture about British support for further enlargement within the Balkans. Even amongst Britain’s 
European partners, there is a clear sense that the UK is no longer the force behind enlargement that it 
once was.151 As a British official working for an international organisation in the region noted, he had 
long since ceased arguing that “Britain was the biggest supporter of enlargement.”152 As a result, the 
countries of the region are starting to turn their attention elsewhere in the search for support for their 
EU membership aspirations. Germany, in particular, has now emerged as the crucial actor. 
 
The question is whether Britain might be able to regain a leadership role on questions of enlargement 
and new members. It is quite possible. It is important to recognise that there are other trends emerging 
that could well force Britain to rethink its growing distance from the region. Most notably, the rising 
concerns about Russia mean that many EU members now believe that a return to the enlargement 
agenda, which has been off the EU radar for the past six or seven years, is crucial. This seems, for 
example, to be a key element shaping German thinking.153 At present, however, such views have yet 
to be articulated openly in Britain. For the meanwhile, the growing distance between the UK and the 
EU, and the widespread worries in Britain about the impact of further immigration appear to be at the 
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forefront of the debate about enlargement. However, it is clear that this cannot happen until the 
United Kingdom makes a firm decision on its own membership of the European Union, and politicians 
are willing to make a positive case for EU enlargement; freedom of movement and all. 
  
